A yes vote in the Scottish referendum would start a serious debate about independence for Wales by Sculley, Roger
blogs.lse.ac.uk
Credit: Walt Jabsco (Flickr creative commons)
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2012/03/15/scotland-wales-independence-
scully/
A Yes vote in the Scottish Referendum would start a
serious debate about independence for Wales
Mar 15 2012
Roger Scully argues that while independence for Wales does not presently enjoy
significant backing, this would change with a Yes vote in the Scottish
independence referendum. It would offer a clear example to which advocates of
independence could point and would alter the fundamental character of the UK
rump that remained.
It seemed to take almost a year after the SNP’s devastating victory in the May 2011
Scottish Parliament election for most of the UK’s political class to begin to realise
the potential implications. Belatedly, the truth seems to have dawned. There will be a referendum in
Scotland on independence. A Yes victory is possible. The British Union, created in 1707, could end.
The referendum will be an event of defining importance for Scotland. But it will also matter a great
deal for the other nations of the Union. Given that Wales is the part of the Union that routinely
receives least attention, it is unsurprising that little public discussion has considered what the
Scottish referendum might mean for the Welsh. But the absence of discussion does not mean an
absence of consequences.
This does not mean that political developments in
Wales inevitably follow from those in Scotland. It is
true that devolution to Wales in the 1990s – albeit
of a much weaker form than that granted Scotland
– would almost certainly not have happened but for
developments further north. But since then there
has been an important political dynamic within
Wales that has been almost wholly unconnected to
anything occurring in Scotland. A substantial
change in attitudes towards devolution is
noticeable since the idea was barely approved by
the Welsh in their 1997 referendum.
This change has occurred both across the mass
public and much of Wales’ political elite. In a further
referendum in March 2011, a significant increase in
the legislative powers of the Welsh Assembly
(towards something rather closer to those currently
enjoyed by the Scottish parliament) was supported by all political parties in the chamber, and given
clear endorsement by the voters. To an extent unimaginable in the 1990s, substantial self-
government for Wales is now the ‘settled will’. That this has occurred has almost nothing to do with
anything that has happened, or might happen, in Scotland.
Subsequent to the March 2011 referendum, the UK government established a new commission to
consider ways in which Welsh devolution might be further developed. However, the terms of
reference of this commission appear to assume a ‘steady state’ across the rest of the UK –
something that now, rather obviously, cannot safely be assumed. What would be the implications for
Wales of a Yes vote in Scotland? Potentially they are almost limitless. But one potential
consequence stands out.
A serious debate in Wales about independence would begin the day after Scotland has voted for
independence (if it ever does). Independence for Wales is not currently something that attracts
significant backing. Public support for independence in surveys has fluctuated without trend around
the 10 percent mark since the mid-1990s. Even Plaid Cymru has, for much of its history, often
appeared ambivalent about the notion of Welsh independence. A Scottish Yes vote would almost
certainly change the whole character of the debate. Partly this would be because Scotland would
offer a clear example to which advocates of independence could point. But a Yes vote would also
matter because Scottish secession would do more than simply reduce the UK in size; it would alter
the fundamental character of the state that remained. As a very senior civil servant in Cardiff
observed to me recently, with Scotland inside the union, one can still believe in the UK as a multi-
national state – albeit one where one nation is much larger than the others. But, as he went on, if
Scotland leaves, ‘Who wants to play Montenegro to England’s Serbia?”
It is far from certain that the end-point of any such debate would be independence for Wales. But, as
even the Labour party’s Welsh First Minister, Carwyn Jones, has acknowledged, after any Scottish
Yes vote there would need to be fundamental discussions among the remaining partners in the UK
about their future relationship. Such discussions would not only matter to Wales: if Britishness, as it
has long been understood by many people, was no longer an available option, the implications for
Northern Ireland might be even more profound. A Scottish Yes vote would also produce a whole
host of practical issues to be dealt with. But more fundamentally, the relationship between the
nations of these islands, including Wales, would surely be changed irrevocably by Scottish
independence.
Yet while the consequences of a Scottish Yes vote certainly deserve serious consideration, at
present a No vote still appears the more likely outcome. However, even a No vote does not seem to
be a ‘status quo’ option. A No vote will still, apparently, be followed by some greater political and
financial autonomy for Scotland. In a context where self-government for the non-English nations of
the UK is generally deepening, there will certainly be calls for extending Welsh devolution. Wales –
no matter which parties hold power in Cardiff – will also be determined to be involved in any
financial discussions, as the nation that currently does worst from the Barnett formula. But in a
context where a paucity of money makes it impossible to resolve difficult issues with discretionary
dollops of extra cash, these discussions will likely be a hard slog. So also might discussions about
the sharing of other resources: to a Wales that is water-rich, the terms under which this increasingly
valued resource is shared with an ever-more thirsty England certainly matter.
But perhaps most fundamentally of all, Wales will be part of the discussions within which even a
continuing United Kingdom will have to be re-thought and re-worked. The dominant mode of thinking
about the UK (when the existence of non-English nations is not actually forgotten about completely)
has long been, in effect, of an English core barely differentiated from the whole, and three separate
forms of union for Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales. But increasingly – with a distinct English
identity re-emerging and with the West Lothian question remaining wholly unresolved – that looks
unsustainable. Bit-by-bit, ad hoc solutions to different parts of the Union will no longer do. Serious
thinking will be needed about what sort of union the different elements, of which Wales is one, wish
to maintain. We can’t just muddle through any more.
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